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After having addressed the existence, requirements and limits of incidental
jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals under Article 288(1) UNCLOS in the first post, this
post turns to the approach taken by the arbitral award in Italy v. India.
Facts of the case
To briefly recapitulate, the case concerned an incident that occurred on 15 February
2012 in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Two armed Italian Navy marines
that belonged to a vessel protection detachment on board the privately owned and
operated Italian flagged oil tanker Enrica Lexie fired shots at the Indian flagged
fishing vessel St. Antony, killing two Indian fishermen (paras. 79-117). Indian
authorities subsequently directed the Enrica Lexie to the Indian port of Kochi and,
thereafter, exercised criminal jurisdiction over the two Italian marines in relation
to the killing of the two Indian fishermen (paras. 118-193), as did Italy in its own
investigation and proceedings (paras. 194-216).
The arbitral tribunal’s characterization of the dispute
The arbitral tribunal characterized the overall dispute in the following terms:
“Having analysed and established the nature of the dispute between the
Parties in the present proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that
the Parties’ dispute is appropriately characterised as a disagreement as
to which State is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the incident of 15
February 2012 involving the ‘Enrica Lexie’ and the ‘St. Antony’, which raises
questions under several provisions of the Convention, including Articles 56,
58, 59, 87, 92, 97, 100, and 300, the interpretation or application of which
the Parties have different views. The dispute may raise, but is not limited to,
the question of immunity of the Marines (para. 243; emphasis added).”
However, it may be doubted, as Judge Robinson did in his dissent (paras. 4-24),
that the arbitral tribunal properly characterized the dispute. Clearly, the immunity
issue formed part of the overall dispute of the parties, but it was the tribunal’s task
to identify to what extent that overall dispute fell within the scope of Article 288(1)
UNCLOS. As Judge Robinson persuasively argued, the “immunity of the marines
is […] a core element of the dispute; it is the real issue in the dispute between
the Parties (para. 29)”. Indeed, based on Italy’s own submissions, the only link
between UNCLOS and the immunity issue would have been a potential renvoi to the
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customary international law of immunity of State officials in the UNCLOS provisions
invoked by Italy. In this respect, Italy’s final submission was:
“By asserting and continuing to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over Chief Master
Sergeant Massimiliano Latorre and Sergeant Salvatore Girone, India is in violation
of its obligation to respect the immunity of the Marines as Italian State officials
exercising official functions, in breach of Articles 2(3), 56(2), 58(2) and 100 of
UNCLOS (para. 75; emphasis added).”
Italy’s unsuccessful reliance on alleged renvoi-provisions in UNCLOS
However, the arbitral tribunal found all provisions invoked by Italy to be inapplicable.
It considered that Articles 2(3), 56(2) and 58(2) of UNCLOS, which concern the EEZ
or territorial sea, were not applicable because India’s enforcement measures were
taken in India’s internal waters and territory (para. 798). It did not take a position
on whether (1) the provisions invoked by Italy do indeed contain a renvoi and/or (2)
whether they constitute obligations to comply with (or to have due regard to) external
rules falling within the scope of the alleged renvoi (cf. the expansive jurisprudence
in Mauritius v. United Kingdom (para. 503), rejected by Judge Robinson in an obiter
dictum in his dissenting opinion (para. 31)).
Italy had also invoked Articles 297(1), 95, 96, and 100 UNCLOS, but these
provisions were equally found by the arbitral tribunal to be inapplicable (paras.
799-802). Thus deprived of applicable provisions in UNCLOS that could (allegedly)
provide a sufficiently strong jurisdictional link under Article 288(1), the arbitral
tribunal acknowledged that UNCLOS “may not provide a basis for entertaining an
independent immunity claim under general international law (para. 809; emphasis
added)”. From this moment, the immunity issue did no longer form part of the
UNCLOS dispute as the arbitral tribunal itself severed the only potential link between
the two. This was not, however, acknowledged by the arbitral tribunal.
The arbitral tribunal’s acceptance of incidental jurisdiction over the immunity
issue
Next, the arbitral tribunal turned to the question of incidental jurisdiction. Curiously,
however, as noted by Judge Robinson in his dissent (paras. 42-49), the tribunal did
not state what it considered the requirements of incidental jurisdiction to be. Despite
the fact that two of the three arbitrators of the majority, Judges Golitsyn and Paik, are
simultaneously arbitrator and president of the tribunal (in reverse order) in Ukraine
v. Russia, the award contains no reference to the findings of that tribunal (which
essentially followed the methodology adopted in Mauritius v. United Kingdom) or the
tribunal in Mauritius v. United Kingdom on questions of incidental jurisdiction.
Instead, the arbitral tribunal simply stated that the dispute “could [not] be
satisfactorily answered without addressing the question of the immunity of the
Marines (para. 805).” In its view, the arbitral tribunal “could not provide a complete
answer to the question as to which Party may exercise jurisdiction without
incidentally examining whether the Marines enjoy immunity (para. 808)”. This was
because “[i]mmunity from jurisdiction, by definition, operates as an exception to an
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otherwise-existing right to exercise jurisdiction” and because the question “[w]hether
that exception applies in the present case is a question that forms an integral part
of the Arbitral Tribunal’s task to determine which Party may exercise jurisdiction
over the Marines (para. 808)”. On this basis, the arbitral tribunal concluded that its
“competence extends to the determination of the issue of immunity of the Marines
that necessarily arises as an incidental question in the application of [UNCLOS]
(para. 809; emphasis added)”.
Was the immunity issue “incidental” to the UNCLOS dispute?
Applying the “necessity” requirement as introduced in the first post, it is quite
evident that the immunity issue was nota preliminary question in the interpretation
or application of any of Italy’s claims based on UNCLOS. As mentioned, after the
arbitral tribunal had rejected Italy’s claims based on (alleged) renvoi provisions in
UNCLOS, none of the remaining provisions invoked required a prior determination
of the immunity issue. Therefore, the immunity issue no longer formed part of the
UNCLOS dispute.
What remained was a dispute as to whether Italy or India (or both) had jurisdiction
under UNCLOS over the incident, requiring an interpretation and application of,
inter alia, Articles 92 and 97 UNCLOS. However, prior to turning to the immunity
issue, the arbitral tribunal found that Italy and India had concurrent jurisdiction under
Article 92(1) UNCLOS over the incident (paras. 363-370). This finding evidently did
not require, as a preliminary question, a determination that the Italian marines did not
enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) stated in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium), there is an important distinction between jurisdiction and immunity
from jurisdiction: “jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while absence of
immunity does not imply jurisdiction (para. 59)”. How, then, could a determination of
the immunity issue have been “necessary” for the determination of the question of
jurisdiction under UNCLOS?
Applying the “ancillarity” requirement, the weight of the immunity dispute within the
overall dispute was – as already stated in the context of the characterization of the
dispute – arguably such that it would probably not have been “minor” to the UNCLOS
dispute, but itself constituted a separate “real issue” falling outside the scope of
incidental jurisdiction under Article 288(1).
Concluding remarks
Regrettably, the award does not address the requirements for incidental jurisdiction
of international courts and tribunals operating under a compromissory clause
generally, nor does it place these general requirements in the specific context
of Part XV of UNCLOS and previous jurisprudence. It seems more convincing
to consider that the immunity issue was not incidental (neither “necessary” nor
“ancillary”) to the UNCLOS dispute.
It is true that the ICJ very recently considered in the ICAO Council Cases (here and
here) that incidental jurisdiction of dispute settlement bodies with limited subject-
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matter jurisdiction may extend to defences based on countermeasures where such
a determination is indispensable to a decision of a claim for which it has jurisdiction.
However, the ICJ’s approach, if one considers it persuasive, is still more restrictive
than that of the arbitral tribunal in India v. Italy. Lawful countermeasures may
preclude State responsibility under rules of the treaty over which jurisdiction exists
(in the present case UNCLOS), whereas the question of immunity at issue in India
v. Italy was not indispensable to the merits of Italy’s claims concerning violations of
provisions of UNCLOS (notably Articles 92, 97 and 100). It was an entirely separate
issue that concerned the violation of the customary international law of immunity of
state officials as primary obligations.
In conclusion, the approach taken by the majority reflects a very broad
understanding of the extent of incidental jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals that
is arguably at odds with the extent of consent to jurisdiction granted under
Article 288(1). If it were to form the starting point of a new line of jurisprudence, it
should be hoped that it is restricted to defenses such as immunity that are at least
closely related to the UNCLOS provisions at issue.
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